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Deferred Action and the Bounds of Agency
Discretion: Reconciling Policy and Legality in
Immigration Enforcement
Peter Margulies*
I. INTRODUCTION
Although agencies rightly have discretion in interpreting statutes,
that discretion does not extend to unraveling carefully crafted legislative
compromises. In immigration law, Congress has for fifty years pursued
a classic trope in the annals of legislative craft: liberalizing the law in
certain respects, while strengthening enforcement in others.' Agency
discretion that is interstitial in character 2 preserves such compromises,
allowing Congress to do its work against a predictable backdrop of
administrative enforcement. In contrast, agency discretion that ignores
the "context" of compromises embodied in legislation undermines the
rationale for judicial deference to agency decisions. 3 Moreover, such
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Colgate, 1978; J.D.,
Columbia Law School, 1981; Director, Roger Williams Immigration Clinic, 2014-2015. The author
served as co-counsel on an anicus curiae brief filed by the Cato Institute and Constitutional Law
Professors in Texas v. United States, Civ. No. 15-40238 (5th Cir. 2015), arguing that the Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA") program was
inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"). I thank Hiroshi Motomura for
comments on a previous draft.
1. See Jane Hong, The Law that Made America diverse; When Congress Overhauled
Immgration in 1965, it Ended a Racist Quota System - and Helped Create Today's Border Problem,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2015, A17, http://www.latimes.com/opinionlop-ed/la-oe-1002-hong-1965-
immigration-act-20151002-story.html [http://perma.cc/BE5P-D6CR] (noting that legislators in 1965
who were initially reluctant to vote for doing away with facial discrimination in immigration statutes
agreed to this reform on condition that amendments impose a uniform per-country cap on legal
immigration to the United States).
2. See Mayburg v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 740 F.2d 100, 106 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer,
J.) (observing that touchstone is what "a sensible legislator would have expected given the statutory
circumstance . .. [t]he less important the question of law, the more interstitial its character ... the less
likely it is that Congress.. . 'wished' or 'expected' the courts to remain indifferent to the agency's
views.").
3. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); see also Utility Air
Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014). The structure of deference alluded to in the
text emerges from administrative law doctrine. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron held that courts should defer to agency
decisions if: (1) the statute is ambiguous, and, (2) the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Id. at
842-45. If a court determines at step one that the statute unambiguously precludes the proposed
agency action, the court does not proceed to step two. Id. at 842-43. In determining whether a
statute is ambiguous, Chevron instructed courts to use "traditional tools of statutory construction."
Id. at 843 n.9. In Brown & Williamson, the Court made clear that construing statutory meaning
under step one of Chevron includes reading the words of a statute "in their context and with a view
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agency excesses threaten the paradigm of the separation of powers
itself, which is premised on coordination between the two political
branches. 4  Despite its basis in sound policy, the Obama
Administration's Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful
Permanent Residents ("DAPA") program is a case in point.5
DAPA grants or facilitates acquisition of most of the benefits of
legal status, 6 such as freedom from removal and work authorization, to
over forty percent of adult noncitizens who are now unlawfully present
in the United States. DAPA's sweeping benefits undermine the
cornerstones of compromise in the Immigration and Nationality Act
("INA"): (1) barriers to legal status for undocumented noncitizens,7
such as prospective DAPA recipients, whose claims for immigration
benefits turn on post-entry U.S. citizen children, (2) comprehensive
deterrence of unlawful entry, presence, and work in the U.S., and (3)
curbs on the exercise of agency discretion that is not interstitial in
character.
In his contribution to this Issue, Professor Motomura seeks to elide
this clash between the DAPA program and the INA by positing the
existence of administrative discretion under immigration law to
reconcile the age-old conflict between "law on the books" and "the law
in action."8 On this view, the text of a statute or regulation (law on the
books) matters less, both descriptively and normatively, than the
situation on the ground subsequent to a statute's enactment (the law in
action). While this distinction can be useful, Professor Motomura's
deployment of the distinction to support DAPA's legality fails for three
reasons.
First, and most importantly, Professor Motomura offers no
normative limiting principle to distinguish between agency discretion
that respects legislative bargains and discretion that undermines such
bargains. Fundamentally, Professor Motomura disagrees with a key
to their place in the overall statutory scheme." See Brown & Wiiamson, 529 U.S. at 133.
4. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
5. In November, 2015, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a nationwide injunction against DAPA's
implementation, finding that DAPA failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). See Texas v. United States, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015), affirming
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (granting nationwide injunction against
implementation of DAPA), stay ofinjunction denied, 787 F.3d 733 (5th Cir. 2015). This Article
analyzes the substantive APA issue addressed by the Fifth Circuit: whether, read in context under
Chevron's test of the judicial deference owed to agency decisions, the INA unambiguously precludes
DAPA. See Texas, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725, at 95-116.
6. By legal status I mean a statutorily recognized basis for an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa
that will allow the recipient of the status to enter or remain in the United States.
7. Throughout this Article, I use the term, "noncitizen," in place of the earlier term, "alien,"
which has now become loaded with adverse connotations that distract from reasoned debate.
8. See Hiroshi Motomura, The President's Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and
the Rule of La win Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 1 (2015).
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compromise that paved the way for the 1965 Act: coupling the
elimination of express national origin discrimination with the
installation of a uniform annual cap on admission of immigrants from
any country, including Mexico. 9 Professor Motomura rightly contends
that Congress was unrealistic in seeking to control the flow of
immigrants from the United States' southern border. That lack of
realism should spur efforts for legislative immigration reform.
However, legislative wishful thinking does not authorize unbounded
agency discretion to revise the clear compromise that Congress struck.
Judicial deference to such unfettered agency discretion would also
undermine the canonical separation of powers framework articulated by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer'o
Second, Professor Motomura's purported distinction between the
law on the books and the law in action proves too much. The executive
branch has justified DAPA as a program that does not alter law on the
books." The government's argument hinges on the distinction between
formal legal status (such as lawful permanent residence) and
immigration benefits (such as a reprieve from removal and work
authorization) that DAPA provides or facilitates. That distinction is
artificial because of overwhelming evidence that Congress wished to
limit both status and benefits to deter unlawful entry or presence.12
However, the government has viewed the status/benefits distinction as
central to its defense of DAPA. By dismantling that distinction,
Professor Motomura actually validates the arguments of DAPA's critics,
who contend that the status/benefits distinction obscures the core issue:
whether DAPA fits under the INA, when the latter is read in context as
a "harmonious whole."13
Third, Professor Motomura inaccurately depicts the law in action,
by severely underestimating marked pre-DAPA reductions to interior
immigration enforcement. Before announcing DAPA, the current
9. Id. at 16.
10. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
11. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Exercising
Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and
with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at
2-3 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14 1120_memo_deferred-action.pdf
[http://perma.cc/2K3L-CMML] [hereinafter DAPA Memorandum]; Memorandum Opinion from
Karl R. Thompson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Sec'y of
Homeland Sec. and the Counsel to the President at 11 (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olcopinions/attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-
prioritize-removal.pdf [perma.cc/8M53-3NJB] [hereinafter OLC Memorandum].
12. See Peter Margulies, The Boundaries of Executive Discretion: Deferred Action, Unlawful
Presence, and Irmigration Law, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 1183, 1201-03 (2015) [hereinafter Margulies,
Boundaries of Executive Discretion].
13. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,133 (2000).
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Administration reduced, by almost sixty percent, removals of
noncitizens who had already unlawfully entered the United States or
accrued periods of unlawful presence. 14 While Professor Motomura
portrays DAPA as a means to discipline an overzealous federal
enforcement bureaucracy, immigration officials' decisive shift in
enforcement priorities undermines that rationale.
This Article is in five Parts. Part II discusses the bedrock principle
of statutory interpretation that courts should read a statute in context
and as a "harmonious whole." I discuss this principle's application in
cases such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.15 on agency
discretion, and in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Yates v.
United StateS16 that a fish is not a "tangible thing" within the meaning
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Part III discusses the Youngstown test of
Justice Jackson, which ties judicial deference to an executive action
under the constitutional separation of powers to the level of
coordination between the political branches that the action exhibits.
Administrative law's checks on executive branch statutory
interpretation serve not only statutory objectives, but constitutional
purposes. DAPA defies these constraints. Deferring to an agency
reading of the INA that distorts the statute's context creates an easy
escape route from the separation of powers architecture that Justice
Jackson described in Youngstown.
To clarify the conflict between DAPA and the INA, Part IV of the
Article discusses the cornerstones of the INA, including deterrence of
unlawful entry, presence, and employment and curbs on executive
discretion. Finally, Part V of the Article deconstructs Professor
Motomura's flawed arguments for DAPA based on the distinction
between law on the books and the law in action.
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN CONTEXT
In statutory interpretation, context prevails over reading statutory
provisions in isolation from the structure, logic, and purpose of
legislation. On occasion, the justices of the Supreme Court have
disagreed about how to read a statute as a whole.' 7 However, the Court
has typically held that when a statute's logic, structure, and purpose are
clear, these factors should inform interpretation of specific statutory
provisions.
14. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations Report, Fiscal Year 2014, at 9 (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/aboutloffices/ero/pdf/2014-ice-immigration-removals.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WJ2H-4939] [hereinafter ICE Enforcement Report].
15. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
16. 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
17. See generally Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
[Vol. 55146
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As a paradigmatic illustration, consider the Court's opinion in
Brown & Williamson. Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, found
that the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") lacked authority to
regulate tobacco.18 To justify this holding, Justice O'Connor reminded
readers that an agency had to consider a statute in context. 19 Each
provision of the statute fits into the "overall statutory scheme." 20
Accordingly, courts read a statute as a "harmonious whole," 21 not a
crazy quilt of random fabrics. In considering whether a statute's context
unambiguously precludes an agency action, "common sense" proportion
is also vital. 22  Since Congress does not "hide elephants in
mouseholes," 23 it is reasonable for a court to require clear and specific
evidence of Congress's intent to delegate to an administrative agency a
"policy decision of . .[great] economic and political magnitude." 24
In Brown & Williamson, Justice O'Connor used this traditional
tool of statutory construction to assess the deference the Court owed to
the FDA's determination that it could regulate tobacco. To answer this
question, the Brown & Williamson Court first had to answer whether
the Food and Drug Act was ambiguous regarding the FDA's authority.
If the Court had found that the statute was ambiguous, it would then
have moved on to the second step of the Chevron inquiry: whether the
agency's reading was reasonable. Because the Brown & Williamson
Court found that the statute precluded the FDA from regulating
tobacco, the Court did not reach this second inquiry.
Reading the Act as a whole, along with other enactments
addressing tobacco, Justice O'Connor concluded that Congress had
clearly placed tobacco beyond the FDA's reach. Justice O'Connor's
reading was pragmatic, weaving together statutory provisions into a
"harmonious whole." 25 Justice O'Connor observed that to permit
marketing of a product subject to the FDA's jurisdiction, the agency
would have to find that the product was safe under the conditions
recommended by the manufacturer. 26 Because tobacco cigarettes are
unsafe under any conditions, the FDA would have been unable to make
this finding.27 Therefore, Justice O'Connor inferred, the inevitable
result of tobacco's amenability to FDA regulation would have been an
18. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133. Congress eventually granted the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") this authority. See Sottera, Inc. v. FDA, 627 F.3d 891, 894 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
19. Brown & Willamson, 529 U.S. at 132.
20. Id. at 133.
21. Id. at 132.
22. Id.
23. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001).
24. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133.
25. Id. at 133 (quoting FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959)).
26. Id at 136-37.
27. Id.
2015] 147
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outright ban on the substance's marketing. 28
Justice O'Connor tried to match this hypothetical result against
other legislative provisions, and found that it did not fit. Congress had
proclaimed in another provision of the U.S. Code that, "the marketing
of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic industries of the United
States .. . and stable conditions therein are necessary to the general
welfare." 29 Rather than ban tobacco, Justice O'Connor explained,
Congress had expressly provided that the government should address
tobacco's health impacts by ensuring that consumers received adequate
information about those health risks.30 Justice O'Connor concluded
that this and similar provisions would be meaningless if Congress
intended to delegate to the FDA the choice to promulgate an outright
ban.3 1 Since a complete assessment of statutory ambiguity had to
consider all of the pertinent provisions enacted by Congress, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the statute in context barred such a broad
delegation.
More recently, the Court decided Yates v. United States, again
illustrating the importance of statutory context. Yates is not a Chevron
case, but it also stresses reading a statute in a common-sense fashion. In
Yates, the Court held that the deliberate misrecording of the weight of a
fish was not a violation of the federal Sarbanes-Oxley Act ("SOX").
Justice Ginsburg, writing for a five justice majority, found that SOX,
which bars deception in records and other tangible things, had been
passed to address deception and overreach in corporate governance.
According to Justice Ginsburg, the statute's context-which had been
passed in the wake of the Enron fiasco, in which investors lost billions as
a result of a publicly traded companies' inflation of profits and assets-
had little to do with fishing on our nation's waters. Expanding the reach
of SOX to such activities would transform the statute's implementation
in a way that Congress could not have intended.32
28. Id. at 136-37 (noting that FDA would be prohibited from granting preapproval a marketing
plan).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 138-39.
31. Id. at 139-40. While the FDA had asserted that it could accomplish public health goals by
regulation short of a ban, Justice O'Connor found that the agency had disregarded the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act's requirement that the agency find that the product itself-i.e., tobacco- was safe.
Id.
32. See also King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (noting that, in determining the
meaning of the term, "exchange," under the Affordable Care Act, a court must consider the term's
place in the "context" of the statute as a whole) (citing Brown & Wiamson, 529 US. at 132). Cf
ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 813-16 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding that statute authorizing collection of
tangible things including phone records that were "relevant" to an investigation did not authorize
government collection in so-called metadata program of virtually all land-line call records for
purposes of querying those records with identifiers such as phone numbers, which the government
had a "reasonable and articulable suspicion" were linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda); but
see Peter Margulies, Dynamic Surveillance: Evolving Procedures in Metadata and Foreign Content
[Vol. 55148
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In sum, a court's common-sense interpretation of statutory context
keeps the executive branch honest. Attention to context constrains run-
away executive branch interpretations, and keeps Congress in the loop,
requiring legislative sign-off on expansive readings that strain an
existing statute to the breaking point. Attention to context thus ensures
that delegations to the executive serve Congress's intent, instead of
promoting other policy agendas. In some cases, those policy agendas
may be appropriate. This was arguably true, for example, of the FDA's
efforts to regulate tobacco. The proper course in such situations, as
Brown & Williamson requires, is to ask the legislature for additional
authority. Congress ultimately provided the FDA with the authority
over tobacco that it sought. That inter-branch dialogue represents
healthy interaction between the political branches, rather than the
precipitous unilateralism that Brown & Williamson seeks to deter.
III. THE SEPARATION OF POWERS As BACKDROP FOR CONSTRAINTS
ON DEFERENCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The absence of these constraints would undermine the separation
of powers edifice crafted by Justice Jackson in Youngstown.33 This
subsection first lays out Justice Jackson's canonical approach. It then
explains why sweeping administrative law deference undermines the
separation of powers, by allowing the executive to do through the back-
door of statutory interpretation what it cannot- do through a
straightforward assertion of executive power. We should be hesitant to
embrace a vision of administrative law that permits this result.
Justice Jackson divided presidential actions into three categories,
based on the degree of collaboration between the President and
Congress. The extent of collaboration determines the deference that a
court will display. The President receives greatest deference for actions
that are consistent with Congress's will, some deference for acts that
occur against a background of congressional silence, and little or no
deference for actions that conflict with legislative intent.34
If the executive branch, in a case like Brown & Williamson, did not
have to read a statute as a "harmonious whole," the executive could
interpret a statutory provision in isolation as a fig-leaf for unilateral acts.
Collection After Snowden, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (2014) (arguing narrow reading of statutory language
authorizing metadata program failed to consider both congressional intent to grant government
flexibility in tracking terrorist groups and safeguards, such as judicial review, built into program).
33. 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets
Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U.L. Rev. 1917, 1924-25 (2012);
cf Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part IT Faithfully Executing the Law, 19 Tex.
Rev. L. & Politics 2015 (2015) (discussing DAPA in light of Youngstown).
34. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38.
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For example, in Youngstown itself, the executive branch could have
argued that Congress did not expressly bar the President from taking
over steel mills in the event of a labor dispute, and that Congress had
therefore either impliedly consented to or acquiesced to the President's
power. 35 The executive could have focused on the lack of an express
bar, rather than on Congress's rejection of an express authorization.
The latter was surely part of the overall context of the Labor
Management Relations Act's enactment, as the majority found. 36
However, relieved of the task of reading the statute as a whole, the
executive would not have to address this point.
Similarly, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,37 the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the President lacked the power to unilaterally establish military
commissions that operated without the procedural safeguards that
Congress wished to include. The executive could have set up a military
commission with materially fewer rights than ordinary courts-martial,
such as the right not to be tried in absentia.38 Under a Chevron analysis
that read the statute through isolated provisions, the court would again
have focused on the lack of a clear bar to the President's unilateral
creation of military commissions. While the executive would have had
to demonstrate that such rights were not "practicable," 39 a court
providing deference without context would have countenanced a very
narrow interpretation of that statutory term. Relying on this narrow
reading, the President would have gotten his way without even entering
the Youngstown arena.
A sweeping view of deference would also undermine the second
category of Justice Jackson's concurrence, dealing with decisions on
which Congress has been silent.40 Here, courts often look to the course
of dealing between Congress and the President. Courts uphold
35. Granted, in Youngstown itself, the detailed nature of the labor-management dispute
resolution process outlined in applicable statutes made it difficult to argue that Congress had
implicitly authorized additional remedies beyond those it had listed. Id. at 586. However, at the time
of Youngstown, administrative law had not yet recognized deference in the systematic way that the
Court did three decades later in Chevron. A reading of deference that does not heed statutory
context could give the executive branch an opening to argue that a presidential seizure of the steel
mills is merely a supplemental remedy implied in Congress's framework.
36. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586 (noting that Congress had rejected an amendment to the
pending labor-management legislation that would have expressly authorized presidential seizures in
emergencies).
37. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
38. Id. at 623-25.
39. Id. at 620 (citing Article 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
40. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id at 610-11 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (arguing that legislative acquiescence should elicit judicial deference). See generally
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (finding congressional acquiescence in presidential
claims settlements with other nations); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915)
(holding that Congress had acquiesced in presidential protection of federal land for conservation and
orderly development); Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation
ofPowers, 126 HARv. L. REV. 411, 414-15 (2012).
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presidential action that matches a venerable course of dealing,41 while
striking down action that fails to dovetail with that set of
understandings. 42 However, an unduly deferential analysis of executive
action would not take full account of congressional action that clashed
with the executive branch's approach. Or courts might find
congressional acquiescence where there was scanty evidence of a course
of dealing and some evidence of congressional resistance over time. For
example, in Medellin v. Texas,43 in which the Court held that the
President lacked the power to order Texas to comply with decisions of
the International Court of Justice, the Court declined to find a pattern
of acquiescence that would satisfy Youngstown's second category.
While the President had claimed authority based on his power to
interpret treaties such as the U.N. Charter and U.S. implementing
legislation, the Court held that Congress had acquiesced only to a far
more limited set of cases involving presidential settlement of claims with
other states as part of recognition or other international negotiations.
If a sweeping view of Chevron deference applied in such cases, a
court that would now reject a claim that Congress had acquiesced in
presidential action might not even reach Youngstown's comparatively
exacting second category, and might find that Congress had implicitly
authorized the action under Justice Jackson's first category. This
tendency would permit the President to sidestep Jackson's third and
most demanding category, in which the President acts alone. Because
the prospect of little or no judicial deference in the third Youngstown
category checks executive unilateralism," this move would undermine
the structure of the separation of powers that the Framers designed.
Granting administrative decisions deference without regard to
statutory context would also clash with Youngstown because it would
require that Congress, rather than the President, assume the burden of
inertia. 45 If Congress disagrees with an administrative interpretation
41. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-82 (discussing Congress's acceptance of executive
practice of agreeing to settle U.S. persons' or entities' claims against foreign nations in exchange for
receipt of diplomatic consideration, including reciprocal claims settlement or, as in Dames, the
release of U.S. hostages).
42. See generally Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008) (declining to find that Congress had
acquiesced in the President's unilateral effort to alter state rules of criminal procedure, despite the
holding of the International Court of Justice, acting pursuant to authority granted by the U.N.
Charter, that the U.S. had to take such action under international law); but see Ingrid Wuerth,
Medellin: The New, New Formalism?, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5-8 (2009) (suggesting that
resort to Youngstown framework in Medelkn was confusing and unnecessary).
43. 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
44. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb -
Framing the Problem, Doctine, and Oninal Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689,700 (2008).
45. CL WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 24 (2010) (discussing burden of inertia as guide to statutory
interpretation).
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that has received deference in the courts, Congress's only option is to
seek to enact new legislation. Indeed, after officials of the Obama
Administration announced DAPA, President Obama asserted that if
Congress disagreed, it merely had to pass legislation of its own.4 6
This assertion fails to reckon with Youngstown's allocation of
interpretive default rules. Any legislation to curb executive
overreaching is subject to a presidential veto. Suppose that Congress
wished to counter an agency interpretation that conflicted with statutory
context, but that had received judicial deference because courts had
abandoned the Brown & Williamson contextual approach. If the
President announced that he would veto any such attempt, Congress's
only option would be to enact legislation with a super-majority that
would override the President's veto. While it is entirely consistent with
the constitutional scheme to impose this requirement when Congress
enacts new legislation, Congress should not have to bear this burden
when it merely wishes to counter an agency interpretation that ignores
or discounts a current statute's context. Imposing this burden on
Congress would eviscerate Justice Jackson's first and second categories,
and leave the President virtually unfettered in the pursuit of unilateral
executive action.
Separation of powers should not replace Chevron's wisdom on the
deference owed to administrative interpretations of federal legislation.
However, separation of powers is part of the backdrop for construing
Chevron's scope. Cabining deference through consideration of the
entire statutory context is a vital check on executive authority and a
central vehicle for vindicating congressional intent.
A. DAPA Considered
DAPA presents a test case on the importance of statutory context
as a limit on executive power. The concerns raised here do not reject
the policy underlying DAPA. Regularizing the situation of the eleven
million undocumented persons in the U.S. should be a national priority.
However, a decent respect for constitutionalism requires that we
address this problem in the way that the Framers intended: through an
Act of Congress, not through unilateral executive action or a strained
executive interpretation of a statute that ignores Congress's repeated
efforts to cabin the executive branch's enforcement discretion.
The modern INA is a legislative bargain that eliminated facial
46. See Kate Zezima & David Nakamura, Obama Takes Pitch for Immigration Reform to
Nashville, WASH. POST, Dec. 10, 2014, A8 (reporting that President Obama would tell Congress that
if it disagreed with DAPA, it should "pass a bill").
[Vol. 55152
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discrimination in U.S. immigration law, but did so at the price of
constructing a "highly selective system for the admission of
immigrants." 47  Professor Motomura in his defense of DAPA
acknowledges the legislative bargain crafted in the landmark 1965
immigration amendments.48 However, Professor Motomura's position
would undermine Congress's well-crafted compromise.
The 1965 Act eliminated facial per-country quotas that had
discriminated against various groups, including Asians. Congress and
President Lyndon Johnson's Administration concluded that these
explicit quotas were both unfair and out of step with the message of
freedom and equality that the United States wished to convey to the rest
of the world. 49 However, Congress also wished to send the message that
the regulation of immigration continued to be a sovereign prerogative.
In its report on the 1965 legislation, the Senate Judiciary Committee
acknowledged that "there are far more people who would like to come
to the United States than the United States can accept."50 That stark
fact required difficult choices. Having abandoned quotas that
discriminated against nationals of particular countries, Congress
imposed a uniform annual cap on legal immigrants from any given
country.5 ' To highlight the move from disparate per-country quotas to a
uniform, nondiscriminatory system, Congress imposed the uniform cap
on Mexican immigrants, as well as nationals from virtually all other
countries. Mexican nationals had formerly not been subject to a cap.
Instead, Congress and the executive branch had allowed them liberal
admission as guest workers for U.S. agricultural firms. 52
Professor Motomura rightly criticizes the self-delusion behind this
effort to control Mexican immigration. The history of Mexican
employment in the agricultural field and the long border between
Mexico and the United States made limits on Mexican immigration
easier to inscribe in law on the books than to implement as the law in
action.53 Self-delusion rarely makes for good policy.
While Professor Motomura's policy analysis is right on target, it is
nonetheless irrelevant to a legal analysis of the INA. Congress's policy
position was shortsighted. Corrective legislation is desperately needed.
47. S. REP. No. 89-748, at 12 (1965), reprintedin 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3328.
48. See Motomura, supra note 8, at 16-18.
49. See Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil R hts Revolution Comes to Imnvra don La w: A New Look
at the Immgration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REv. 273, 279-83 (1996); Kevin R.
Johnson, Race, the Immigration Laws, and Domestic Race Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the
Heart ofDarkness, 73 IND. L.J. 1111, 1127-1131 (1998).
50. S. REP. No. 89-748, at 14.
51. Motomura, supra note 8, at 15.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id at 15-16.
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However, accepting that Congress made the wrong choice as a policy
matter does not cede power to the executive branch to revisit the choice
Congress made or allow it to reinterpret the INA to accomplish that
result.
B. DAPA as Undermining Congress's Design of Deterrence in the INA
In the years since 1965, Congress has repeatedly emphasized the
deterrent purposes of immigration law. Congress's design for
deterrence concentrated on the same individuals that DAPA aims to
benefit: noncitizens who entered the United States or remained here
unlawfully and relied on post-entry U.S. citizen children to obtain a
lawful status. Congress also enacted provisions aimed at deterring
unlawful presence, eliminating the "magnet" of U.S. jobs, and limiting
discretionary awards of immigration benefits. DAPA undermines all of
Congress's work.
For Congress, the deterrence of unlawful immigration is a
necessary complement to the promotion of legal immigration. As the
House Judiciary Committee report on the Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA") 54 explained,
cardinal objectives of immigration law include the timely processing of
persons entitled to lawful status, and the "prompt exclusion or removal
of those who are not so entitled."55 The 1996 House report identified
individuals who overstayed on temporary visas given to students and
tourists as undermining this goal.56 Foreign nationals who entered the
U.S. without inspection and then remained unlawfully also undermined
the system, and were thus targets of Congress's heightened efforts at
deterrence of immigration law violations.57  Instead of respecting
Congress's deliberate choices, DAPA confers substantial benefits on a
large proportion of the cohort that Congress wished to deter.
1. The Deterrent Effect of Bars to Admission Based on Unlawful
Presence
As one example of Congress's repeated efforts to deter unlawful
immigration, consider the bars imposed in IIRIRA on admission of
noncitizens who have been unlawfully present in the United States.58
54. Illegal Inunigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1997).
55. See H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, Immigration Mn the National Interest Act of 1995, H.R.
Doc. No. 104-469, at 111 (2d Sess. March 4, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 House Judiciary Report].
56. Id. at 114-16.
57. Id. at 116.
58. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (2012).
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The effect of these bars is stark. Individuals who leave the United
States after having been unlawfully present for a period of more than
180 days but less than one year are subject to a three-year bar on
admission to the United States. 59  Congress sent an even harsher
message to foreign nationals who leave the United States after having
been unlawfully present for one year or more: they are subject to a ten-
year bar.60
These provisions demonstrate Congress's commitment to deterring
unlawful immigration. The unlawful presence bars adversely affect
noncitizens such as prospective DAPA recipients who, because of a
family relationship or an employment-related skill, might receive a U.S.
visa in the future, but do not currently have a visa entitling them to
lawfully enter the United States. By enacting the unlawful presence
bars, Congress bridged a gap in enforcement which would otherwise
have allowed noncitizens in this group to violate the immigration laws
with impunity.
Suppose that such an individual decides to "jump the queue" by
unlawfully entering or remaining in the United States before a visa
becomes available. That person then accrues a period of unlawful
presence that triggers the statutory bar. Once the noncitizen has
accrued this period, Congress's design erects a formidable barrier to
subsequent receipt of a visa.
Under the INA, persons who enter the United States without being
lawfully inspected, admitted, or paroled must leave the United States
before they can receive a visa entitling them to lawful entry into the
United States. 61 However, once such persons have been unlawfully
present in the United States for more than 180 days, their departure will
trigger an unlawful presence bar. While a waiver of the unlawful
presence bars is available, Congress deliberately excluded from
eligibility the parents of citizens and lawful permanent residents
("LPRs")- the very individuals who would be eligible for DAPA's
benefits.62 This result is harsh, potentially separating close family
members or requiring an individual to forego a visa that would
otherwise be available. However, the harshness built into the unlawful
59. Id. at § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I).
60. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(II); see Zoe Lofgren, A Decade ofRadical Change in Imnigration
Law:An Inside Perspecdve, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 349,361 (2005) (explaining that an immigrant
who departs the country after one year of unauthorized stay is barred from receiving any immigration
benefits for ten years).
61. See8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2015).
62. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v). The waiver is only available to an immigrant who is the
"spouse or son or daughter" of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident ("LPR"). The applicant
for the waiver must also show that the refusal of admission to the applicant would result in "extreme
hardship" to the citizen or LPR "spouse or parent" of the immigrant. Id.
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presence bars' operation is far from inadvertent. That harshness is a
signal of Congress's commitment to deterring unlawful entry and
presence across the board, even for noncitizens who might otherwise be
eligible for a visa. DAPA muddles Congress's message.
C. The Age Floor on US. Citizens' Sponsorship of Immediate
Relatives
Deterring unlawful entrants from using post-entry U.S. citizen
children to acquire a legal status was a key element of the compromise
underlying the 1965 Immigration Act. Just as Congress crafted the
waiver of the unlawful presence bars to exclude this group, Congress in
1965 crafted the definition of an "immediate relative" under the INA to
require that U.S. citizens must be at least twenty-one years of age to
sponsor parents for lawful permanent residence. 63 The age floor on
U.S. citizen sponsors was a deliberate decision by Congress to bolster
deterrence.
The age floor figured in a telling exchange that influenced drafting
of the 1965 Act. Senator Robert Kennedy of New York, a former
Attorney General of the United States, agreed with Senator Sam Ervin
of North Carolina, who subsequently became chair of the Senate
Watergate Committee, that changing the age floor would be "unwise.""
Both Senators acknowledged that abolishing the age floor on child
sponsors would encourage more undocumented foreign nationals to stay
or remain in the United States through the simple expedient of having a
child within U.S. boundaries. 65
Senators Kennedy and Ervin did not view undocumented parents
of U.S. citizens as blameworthy; they simply wanted to deter unlawful
entry into or presence in the United States. Impeding undocumented
noncitizens' reliance on U.S. citizen children for legal status was one
cornerstone of the 1965 Act's deterrence strategy. DAPA, by rewarding
parents of U.S. citizen children with prized indicia of legal status such as
a formal, renewable reprieve from removal, and the strong likelihood of
permission to secure legal employment, undermines the architecture of
deterrence that Congress had put in place.
63. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 201(b), 79 Stat. 911 (1965).
That provision remains the law today. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012); see also STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAw AND POLICY 258 (6th
ed. 2015) (explaining the immediate relative category); see also Texas, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725, at
100 (finding that INA's age floor on citizen sponsors clashed with DAPA's provision and enabling of
substantial immigration benefits to parents of younger citizens).
64. Immigration: Hearings on S. 500 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration & Naturalization,
89th Cong. 230 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Judiciary Hearings].
65. Id.; see also Josh Blackman, The Constitutionaity of DAPA Part I Congressional
Acquiescence to DeferredAction, 103 GEO. L.J. Online 96,107 n.68 (discussing 1965 exchange).
156 [Vol. 55
The Bounds ofAgency Discretion
D. Reducing the Role of US. Jobs as a "Magnet" for Unlawful
Immigration
In addition to discouraging undocumented noncitizens' reliance on
post-entry U.S. children and deterring unlawful presence generally,
Congress has also acted repeatedly to reduce the role that U.S. jobs play
as a "magnet" for unlawful immigration.66 In 1986, when Congress in
the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA") provided a
pathway to LPR status for millions of undocumented noncitizens, it did
so as part of a grand compromise that also for the first time imposed
sanctions on U.S. employers who failed to require documentation of
noncitizens' legal eligibility for work. 67  Congress stressed that
legalization would be a "'one-time only' program." 68 The Senate
Report on IRCA confidently opined that there would be no need for
further legalizations, because employer sanctions would deter future
unlawful migration. 69
Congress is not known for its clairvoyance. Within a decade,
legislators understood that the employer sanctions in IRCA were
insufficient. In 1996, when Congress passed IIRIRA, it acted again to
curb the prospect of U.S. employment, describing weak enforcement of
IRCA's employer sanctions program as a cardinal reason for the
"failure" of U.S. immigration policy. 70 The House Report on IIRIRA
condemned inadequate enforcement of employer sanctions as
"ineffective in deterring ... the illegal entry of aliens seeking
employment."71 Underlining Congress's view that tougher enforcement
was needed, the House Report used harsh language, blaming lax
enforcement for the "four million illegal aliens residing in the United
States." 72
Congress's approach in 1996 is vulnerable to criticism on linguistic
and policy grounds, but provides further proof of DAPA's inconsistency
with the INA. One can fault Congress for its language; scholars of
immigration law have rightly decided to use more neutral terms, such as
"undocumented noncitizen," to describe individuals who are unlawfully
66. 1996 House Judiciary Report, supra note 51, at 126 (describing U.S. jobs as the "primary
magnet for illegal immigration"); see also Texas, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725, at 103 (discussing
tension between DAPA's enabling of work authorization for substantial percentage of
undocumented noncitizens and "Congress's stated goal of closely guarding access to work
authorization and preserving jobs for those lawfully in the country").
67. See Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, PUB. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986).
68. S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. No. 99-132, at 16 (1985)
[hereinafter 1985 Senate Judiciary Committee Report].
69. Id.
70. See 1996 House Judiciary Report, supra note 51, at 108.
71. Id.
72. Id.
2015]1 157
Washburn Law Journal
present.73 One can also fault the 1996 legislators as unencumbered by
the gift of prophecy, since employer sanctions do not work better today
than they did then and the ranks of undocumented noncitizens have
swelled to approximately eleven million. The linguistic and policy
critiques are compelling. However, Congress's harsh criticism of
sanctions enforcement in 1996 also casts an unsparing light on DAPA's
legality.
Given Congress's persistent steps to limit the lure of U.S. jobs, it
simply defies "common sense" 74 to find that Congress delegated
authority to immigration officials to promulgate DAPA. DAPA's
facilitation of U.S. employment for forty percent of undocumented
noncitizens stands in marked contrast with Congress's repeated efforts
to limit the lure of U.S. jobs for foreign nationals who violate U.S.
immigration law. The Congress that passed employer sanctions in 1986
and bolstered them in 1996 would see DAPA as a surrender to the
unlawful immigration that Congress has repeatedly sought to deter.
Some accommodation to unlawful migration is both wise and humane,
particularly given the U.S. equities accumulated by the undocumented
population.75 However, the accommodation of unlawful migration is
emphatically not the animating impulse behind the INA.
E. Congress's Efforts to Limit Executive Discretion
DAPA also clashes with repeated efforts by Congress to narrow
administrative discretion. Congress has permitted interstitial uses of
discretion, including reprieves from removal that form a bridge to a
legal status that is attainable within a reasonable time. 76 However,
Congress has repeatedly checked immigration officials' efforts to wield
more sweeping discretion.77
Consider Congress's limits on grants of extended voluntary
departure ("EVD") to noncitizens who had been in removal
proceedings. Until IIRIRA, undocumented foreign nationals who were
73. LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 63, at 1. (explaining that "'noncitizen' conveys
essentially the same technical meaning [as the term, 'alien'] without the same baggage.").
74. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000); Texas, 2015 U.S.
App. Lexis 19725, at 104.
75. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRATION
AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 161-62 (2006) (discussing prevention of permanent
underclass of noncitizens in U.S.).
76. See Margulies, Boundaries of Executive Discretion, supra note 12, at 1216-20; see also
Texas, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725, at 114 (discussing past "interstitial" uses of deferred action); infra
notes 84-101 and accompanying text (same).
77. See Margulies, Boundaries of Executive Discretion, supra note 12, at 1209 (noting that in
1990s, "Congress rolled back immigration officials' discretion"). Another recent scholarly account of
discretion errs by downplaying Congress's efforts. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
President andmnmgration La w, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 465 (2009).
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subject to removal had been able to apply for EVD. Grants of EVD
allowed noncitizens who were removable to remain in the U.S. for
protracted periods, sometimes amounting to several years.78 Instead of
merely granting a noncitizen a brief grace period to wind up his or her
affairs in the United States and prepare to leave, immigration officials
had transformed EVD into a vehicle for foreign nationals to linger in
the U.S. indefinitely. Grants of EVD became a kind of small-scale
precursor to the proposed DAPA program.
In IIRIRA, Congress decisively curbed this practice. Barring the
protracted EVD periods that agency officials had granted to individuals
in removal proceedings, Congress limited grants of voluntary departure
to 120 days.79 Tellingly, Congress cabined administrative discretion
even though EVD was a far more modest program than DAPA. To be
eligible for EVD, a noncitizen had to already be in removal proceedings.
Few noncitizens choose this option, which places them at risk for
removal from the United States. Nonetheless, Congress evidently felt
that the license to linger through protracted periods of EVD
undermined the deterrent purposes of immigration law. DAPA
undermines deterrence in a far more comprehensive fashion, since it
allows noncitizens to apply for substantial immigration benefits without
the risk of removal proceedings. Having balked at the relatively modest
discretionary benefits provided by EVD, the same Congress would
surely bridle at the cornucopia of benefits provided by DAPA.
F Past Uses of Discretion
Understanding the role of official discretion in the INA as a whole
also requires understanding when Congress has approved or acquiesced
in the exercise of discretion. Since Congress performs regular oversight
regarding immigration enforcement,80 past discretion is part of the
INA's context. A use of discretion that is markedly broader than past
exercises of discretion is more likely to intrude on a matter that
Congress wished to decide itself. Moreover, past discretion also affects
a separation of powers analysis. Under Justice Jackson's second
78. See generally Lynda J. Oswald, Note, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the
Attorney General's Discretion in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REv. 152 (1986).
79. 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(2)(A) (2012); cf Barroso v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir.
2005) (explaining statutory changes); Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and
Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312,
10,324 (Mar. 6, 1997) (same).
80. Indeed, Congress's earlier attempt to create a structural check on agency discretion was
actually struck down by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down
legislative veto on award of discretionary relief to noncitizen). While Chadha may have been rightly
decided, the relevant point here is that Congress has always been vitally concerned with discretion in
immigration enforcement.
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Youngstown category, past practice illuminates Congress's acquiescence
in executive power. Courts that ignore past practice therefore defer
unduly as a matter of administrative law, and give short shrift to the
inquiry on legislative acquiescence that the separation of powers
requires.
While Congress has often sought to curb discretion over
immigration benefits for undocumented noncitizens,81 it has permitted
discretion in only three bounded categories. Immigration officials may
offer deferred action as a bridge to legal status for noncitizens who will
acquire such status within a reasonable period of time.82 Deferred
action has also aided a small group of noncitizens suffering from
extraordinary individual hardships such as age or infirmity83 or those at
risk because of exigent events abroad, including civil strife or natural
disasters.84
1. Deferred Action as a Bridge to Legal Status
As straightforward examples of deferred action as a bridge to legal
status, consider applicants for U and T visas85 and the Family Fairness
program initiated under President George H.W. Bush.86 Congress
generally authorized U visas for victims of crime, and in particular,
authorized T visas for victims of human trafficking. Under the INA, an
applicant for either status who has made out a "prima facie case for
approval" is eligible for a stay of removal that will last until the
applicant has actually received the visa, and is also eligible for deferred
action in the event of the denial of a stay.87 Without this relief, the
81. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
82. Memorandum from Gene McNary, Commissioner of INS, on Family Fairness: Guidelines
for Voluntary Departure under 8 CFR 242.5 for the Ineligible Spouses and Children of Legalized
Aliens, 67(6) Interpreter Releases 164 (1990) [hereinafter McNary, Family Fairness Memorandum]; 8
U.S.C. §§ 1227(d)(1), (2), (4) (2012) (providing for stay of removal and acknowledging availability of
deferred action for applicants for U and T visas, available under the INA for individuals who
respectively have been victims of crime or assisted in the prosecution of human traffickers).
83. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role ofProsecutoial Discretion in Immigration Law, 9
CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) [hereinafterWadhia, Prosecutonal Discretion].
84. Relief of this kind has been expressly authorized by the Congress as a grant of Temporary
Protected Status ("TPS"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1) (stating criteria for TPS); id. § 1254a(g)
(stating that TPS is "exclusive authority" delegated by Congress to immigration officials to "to
permit aliens who are ... deportable ... to remain in the United States temporarily because of their
particular nationality or region of foreign state of nationality."). President George H.W. Bush issued
a signing statement regarding the INA that claimed that the executive branch might have
independent constitutional authority to act to protect foreign nationals in the United States from
harm they would encounter if they returned to their country of origin, even if those foreign nations
did not meet the criteria for TPS. See President George Bush, Statement on Signing the Immigration
Act of 1990 (Nov. 29, 1990), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=19117
[http://perma.cc/6U5H-BV5W].
85. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(U), (T).
86. The following paragraphs are based on previous work. See Margulies, Boundaries of
Executive Discretion, supra note 12, at 1216-22.
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1).
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limits on the number of visas available in a given year for each status
would result in the removal of persons who met the substantive standard
and were merely "waiting their turn." This result would be unfair and
inefficient, since U and T visas typically become available in a couple of
years and an individual removed from the U.S. would have her life
disrupted and then have to resume it when a visa became current.
Deferred action resolves these anomalies for the small number of
prospective U and T visa recipients.
Similarly, the Family Fairness Program initiated by President
George H.W. Bush88 merely served as a bridge for the spouses and
children of adults expressly granted LPR status by Congress under
IRCA. All of the spouses and children granted relief under this
program, which was expressly ratified by Congress soon after its
implementation,8 9 would have been eligible for visas within a short time
under existing law.90 Family Fairness merely provided a bridge to that
status.
In contrast, the arduous route painstakingly engineered by
Congress for prospective DAPA grantees is an obstacle course that no
bridge can span. Because of the age floor on citizen sponsorship of
parents and the unlawful presence bars, DAPA's prospective
beneficiaries cannot expect a visa within a reasonable period of time. 91
The age floor on citizen sponsorship that emerged from the 1965
Kennedy-Ervin colloquy will often require prospective DAPA
recipients to wait fifteen to twenty years to even apply for a legal status.
If undocumented parents seek to remain in the United States unlawfully
for that period, the ten-year unlawful presence bar will lengthen their
wait by another decade. In other words, the INA would routinely
require a wait of twenty-five to thirty years for many prospective DAPA
recipients. It strains credulity to assert that Congress, which enacted the
unlawful presence bars and modified extended voluntary departure to
discourage lingering in the United States by undocumented immigrants,
would implicitly authorize immigration officials to permit such a
protracted sojourn in the United States for prospective DAPA grantees.
88. See McNary, Family Fairness Memorandum, supra note 82, at 164-65. One influential
commentator has taken a broader view of the Family Fairness Program's significance. See Mark
Noferi, When Reagan and GHW Bush Took Bold Executive Action On Immigration, THE HILL
(Oct. 2, 2014 12:00 p.m.), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/219463-when-reagan-
and-ghw-bush-took-bold-executive-action-on [http://perma.cc/NX7B-74NY]. For reasons given in
the text of this Article, I view a broader reading of Family Fairness as overstating its role, which was
merely ancillary to a legal status that would soon be available to its recipients.
89. See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990).
90. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (authorizing immigrant visas for "spouses or children" of LPRs);
Margulies, Boundaries ofExecutive Discretion, supra note 12, at 1217-18 (discussing relatively brief
waiting time for visas sought by Family Fairness recipients).
91. See Margulies, Boundaries ofExecutive Discretion, supra note 12, at 1120-21.
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2. Deferred Action and Hardship
Immigration officials have also granted deferred action in a
relatively small number of hardship cases. These cases typically involve
extreme youth, age, or infirmity. 92 For example, immigration officials
might grant deferred action in the case of an elderly foreign national
suffering from Alzheimer's disease. While Congress has never expressly
authorized deferred action in such cases, the exercise of discretion in
cases of severe hardship does not undermine the statutory framework.
Individuals who are very young, very old, or infirm, are few and far
between, so granting them relief does not adversely affect the
deterrence that Congress sought to build into the INA. Indeed, data
analyzed by the foremost scholar of hardship grants suggests that
immigration officials grant less than a thousand such requests
annually.93 This is a tiny fraction of the millions of undocumented
noncitizens who could claim benefits under DAPA. The compelling
individual circumstances and small numbers of individuals aided by
hardship-based deferred action firmly distinguish this cohort from
DAPA's sweeping, blanket relief.94
92. See Leon Wildes, The Deferred Action Program of the Bureau of Citizensh4, and
Imrmgration Services: A Possible Remedy for Impossible Immigration Cases, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
819 (2004). Ironically, Professor Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, a supporter of President Obama's
DAPA program, has provided the most comprehensive analysis of the far more modest past uses of
deferred action, including relief based on individual hardships. See SHOBA SIVAPRASAD WADHIA,
BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES 69
(2015) (noting that in a recent four-month period in 2013, one major immigration agency, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, granted only 233 deferred action requests based on hardships
such as age or infirmity); cf id. at 75 (reporting that another major agency, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, granted just under 500 such requests in an eight-year period).
93. See WADHIA, BEYOND DEPORTATION: THE ROLE OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN IMMIGRATION CASES, supra note 92, at 69,71,75.
94. Immigration officials also provide relief pursuant to constitutional and statutory
requirements to noncitizens whom officials cannot remove because of lack of cooperation from the
noncitizen's home country. This issue affects Cuban nationals who have committed crimes in Cuba
that make them inadmissible to the United States and former lawful permanent residents who have
received a final order of removal because they have been convicted of certain crimes in the United
States. The countries of origin of these individuals are often reluctant to consent to their return,
precisely because they have committed crimes. In other cases, the United States will not remove
noncitizens to certain countries because the noncitizens might face persecution or torture, even in
cases where the noncitizen does not qualify for a grant of asylum status. The Supreme Court has held
that the Constitution prohibits indefinite detention of such individuals when immigration officials
cannot demonstrate that removal is possible within a reasonable period. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 699 (2001). In such cases, the government grants individuals release from detention
pursuant to an order of supervision, which will often provide the noncitizen with work authorization.
See Geoffrey Heeren, The Status ofNonstatus, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1115, 1146-48 (2015). That order
of supervision resembles the supervised release that law enforcement provides to convicted felons in
the form of probation or parole. Because immigration officials grant orders of supervision pursuant
to the Constitution or statutory requirements, this relief is not "discretionary" in the same sense as
relief that officials would award under DAPA.
162 [Vol. 55
2015] The Bounds of Agency Discretion 163
3. Limited Parole
The executive branch also has limited power under the INA to
extend parole or related relief to individuals at risk because of crises
abroad, including natural disasters such as earthquakes, and man-made
crises such as civil war. However, this power also is distinguishable from
DAPA's sweeping relief.
To the extent that parole power rests directly on executive
authority granted by Article II of the Constitution, 95 it derives support
from a direct relationship with foreign affairs that DAPA lacks, because
DAPA deals only with foreign nationals who are already in the United
States and wish to remain here indefinitely. To the extent that the
President's power stems from delegation by Congress, Congress has
limited that power to "case-by-case" decisions supported by "urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit." 96 In light of the
multiple provisions of the INA that discourage undocumented foreign
nationals' reliance on U.S. citizen children to gain a legal status, it would
be incongruous to read the INA's parole provisions as encompassing the
sweeping relief that DAPA provides. Indeed, even champions of
executive discretion have conceded that, it is "far from clear .. . today"
that the executive branch continues to have the power it did before
Congress limited parole authority. 97
G. Congress's Express Delegations to imngration Officials Cannot
Bear DAPA's Weight
Seeking to blunt the force of Congress's efforts to curb
95. CL Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) (holding that the President had exclusive
power over matters involving recognition of foreign governments and that Congress was therefore
precluded from taking measures such as requiring listing of Israel as country of birth for U.S. citizen
born in Jerusalem, when Executive viewed status of Jerusalem as matter to be determined in future
negotiations between Israel and Palestinian Authority).
96. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also id. § 5(B) (requiring showing of "compelling reasons
in the public interest with respect to [the] particular alien" whom the executive branch wishes to
parole into the United States).
97. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 77, at 505. The Supreme Court's dicta in cases such as
Anzona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) (holding that portions of Arizona law were
preempted by INA) and Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discimination Committee (AADC), 525
U.S. 471, 483-84 (1999) does not bolster the case for DAPA. That dicta supports discretion to curb
delay caused by foreign nationals' challenges to denials of deferred action, AADC, 525 U.S. at 484-
85, or disruption caused by state laws that clash with executive immigration enforcement. Arizona,
132 S. Ct. at 2499. In the first situation, foreign nationals' challenges would have hindered timely
immigration enforcement. Making discretionary denials unreviewable removed that threat. In the
second situation, state laws would have effectively abrogated executive discretion over immigration
enforcement priorities and subjected sensitive immigration-related foreign affairs decisions to a veto
by any one of fifty disparate state governments. Praising discretion here highlighted the foreign
affairs aspect of immigration enforcement and curbed the risk of state sabotage of federal
immigration policy. In contrast, cabining the sweeping discretion exhibited in DAPA would not
delay enforcement or displace federal enforcement priorities-it would merely curb the executive
branch's power to establish massive new immigrant benefits programs that clash with the INA's
carefully crafted provisions deterring unlawful presence in the United States.
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discretionary immigration benefits and the narrow relief available
historically, immigration officials have looked to grants of statutory
authority. However, these grants are generic provisions that authorize
agency action within a preexisting statutory context. That context also
contains Congress's curbs on discretion and the course of dealing
between Congress and the President that has previously engendered
limited relief.
For example, the INA stipulates that the Attorney General (along
with the Secretary of Homeland Security) should "establish such
regulations; prescribe such forms of bond, reports, entries, and other
papers; issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems
necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this
[Act]."98 While the reference to what the Attorney General "deems
necessary" may suggest substantial discretion, the section ties official
discretion to the "provisions" of the INA. As the Supreme Court
observed in Brown & Williamson, courts should read those provisions as
a "harmonious whole." 99 The agency can perform acts, including the
issuance of regulations, that are necessary to uphold the power granted
by the statute; nothing in this provision gives the agency license to
exceed that power. Indeed, much of the authority alluded to in the
section, such as the reference to "forms of bond, reports, entries, and
other papers," involves either the routine work of keeping Congress and
the public informed about immigration enforcement or the equally
routine case-by-case determination of individual claims.
Similarly, Congress's definition of immigrants authorized to work
as those granted employment authorization by immigration officialsoo
does not give those officials unfettered power. This subsection provides
guidance for employers, who need clarity about which noncitizens they
can hire legally to stay on the right side of Congress's employer
sanctions. The subsection instructs employers that they will not be
subject to sanctions if they hire a noncitizen who provides them with a
government-issued employment authorization document. The generic
guidance for employers in this section cannot underwrite the profound
departures from past practice that DAPA entails.101
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (emphasis added); see Texas, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 19725, at 112-13
(arguing that this and similar provisions are generic grants of authority for routine administrative
tasks, not authorizations for unprecedented relief such as DAPA).
99. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3).
101. Common sense would indicate that if Congress had granted immigration officials authority
to exponentially increase the number of undocumented immigrants granted employment
authorization, Congress would have had a more formal mechanism in place to discern the agency's
reasoning for such moves. A more formal mechanism might include the certification process that
Congress has required in a number of sensitive areas, such as the release of detainees from
Guantanamo. That certification process requires a cabinet-level official to attest that the action
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IV. PROFESSOR MOTOMURA'S DICHOTOMY BETWEEN "LAW ON THE
BOOKS" AND "LAW IN ACTION" DOES NOT ADDRESS CONCERNS
ABOUT DAPA'S LEGALITY
Professor Motomura's contribution to this debate is a distinction
well known to law and society scholars: the distinction between "law on
the books" and the "law in action."1 02 This dichotomy, which I will call
the formal/contextual distinction, has assumed importance in sociolegal
scholarship as a descriptive thesis. For sociolegal scholars, describing
legal norms is not merely a matter of quoting from statutes or even
citing judicial opinions-it also requires reckoning with how the law
works in practice. 103 The formal/contextual distinction arises because
the factors that drive the law in action can produce enforcement regimes
that a law's drafters did not intend or expect. Professor Motomura
contends that the formal/ contextual distinction cements the legal case
for DAPA.
Professor Motomura's effort to support DAPA's legality through
the formal/contextual distinction encounters three basic problems.
First, because the distinction is primarily descriptive, it requires an
accurate account of the law in practice. The facts regarding the key
issue of pre-DAPA interior (as opposed to border) immigration
enforcement- simply do not support Professor Motomura's argument.
Second, the distinction actually highlights DAPA's inconsistency with
Congress's framework. The distinction focuses on the actual effects of
DAPA, such as its facilitation of work authorization for DAPA
recipients, and how those effects square vel non with the INA. Third,
precisely because the formal/contextual distinction is fundamentally
descriptive in nature, it is often irrelevant to the interpretation of
normative legal requirements. Statutes such as the INA, as we have
discussed, frequently emerge from compromises between opposing
taken, such as the release of a detainee, is consistent with U.S. interests. See Supplemental
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 11-32, § 14103, 123 Stat. 1859, 1920-21 (2009); cf David JR. Frakt,
Prisoners of Congress: The Constitutional and Political Clash Over Detainees and the Closure of
Guantanamo, 74 U. PITr. L. REV. 179 (2012) (discussing congressional restrictions); see generally
Brown & Willamson, 529 U.S. at 160 (discussing Court's view that substantial new exercises of
executive discretion should have an anchor in statutory text). A certification for substantially raising
the number of employment authorization grants would require the Secretary of Homeland Security
to attest that such massive grants would not disrupt the U.S. economy. However, Congress has never
tried to enact such a procedure. The absence of such a procedure, together with the track record of
far more modest use of deferred action, see supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text, suggests that
Congress authorized only the interstitial use of deferred action that was the established norm prior to
DAPA's implementation.
102. See Motomura, The President's Dilemma, supra note 8, at 19-21; Martha Chamallas,
Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 778 (1988)
(discussing how distinction plays out in area of law and sexuality).
103. This focus will often involve studying persons and groups affected by the law, as well as the
"street-level bureaucrats" who enforce legal norms.
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camps with differing normative and descriptive perspectives. As
Professor Motomura acknowledges, legislative compromise may turn on
particular factors, including difficult trade-offs between dealing with the
realities of Mexican immigration and dismantling the express
discrimination that pervaded the INA before the 1965 Act. The formal/
contextual distinction may counsel changing current law to better
accommodate these trade-offs, but has nothing definitive to say about
current law's content.
A. The La win Action Currently Reflects Policymakers'Stated
Priorities
One "law in action" justification frames DAPA as a means to
ensure that field-level officials comply with policymakers' priorities and
efficiently use limited resources.1? This justification fails to persuade
for three reasons. First, current immigration enforcement closely tracks
policymakers' prioritization of border, as opposed to interior,
enforcement and the removal of noncitizens who have committed
serious or multiple crimes. Second, immigration officials have provided
no support for their claim that their growing multi-billion dollar budget
precludes the interior enforcement pursued by previous administrations.
Third, the resource argument proves too much. While immigration
officials, like all other officials tasked with enforcing the law, have
limited resources, no other agency has unilaterally and without
legislative authorization proposed a program that allows a substantial
proportion of individuals who have broken the law to enhance the
benefits gained through their violations.
Touting DAPA as promoting the priorities set for U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") ignores ICE's own
removal statistics. While immigration opponents claim that border
enforcement is lax,105 statistics show that the Department of Homeland
Security ("DHS") has successfully concentrated its removal efforts at
points of entry into the United States. According to ICE, over two-
thirds of its removals concern individuals who were apprehended while
seeking to enter the country. 106 On the other hand, while immigration
advocates have disparaged President Obama as a "deporter-in-chief"
104. Motomura, supra note 8, at 24-27.
105. See Editorial, Crazy Talk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, at A28 (describing positions on
immigration taken by Republican presidential candidates at debate).
106. See ICE Enforcement Report, supra note 14, at 7 (noting that 213,719 removals out of a
total of 315,943 stemmed from border enforcement). Less than one-third of all removals involved
individuals located within the U.S. interior, who had already entered the United States and been in
the country for lengths of time ranging from days to years. Id. (citing 102,224 removals from the
interior of the United States).
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who broke up immigrant families long established in the United States,
government statistics demonstrate the flaws in this claim. ICE removal
statistics indicate that enforcement in the interior portions of the United
States directed at apprehending noncitizens after a period of unlawful
presence has dropped almost sixty percent during the Obama
administration. 107 Moreover, ICE's interior enforcement focuses, as its
priorities dictate,108 on individuals who have committed crimes. Eighty-
five percent of interior removals involved individuals who had been
convicted of a crime, 109 and seventy-five percent of this group involved
the commission of either crimes classified as "aggravated felonies"
under the INA, other felonies, or at least three misdemeanors.110
ICE's own statistics prove that DAPA is unnecessary as a vehicle
for reforming enforcement priorities. Even before DAPA, a scant
percentage of ICE enforcement resources went to the removal of law-
abiding undocumented immigrants in the U.S. interior. According to
ICE's own records, ICE employees follow ICE's priorities by focusing
on points of entry and interior immigrants who have committed serious
or multiple offenses. Given this decisive pivot in enforcement priorities,
DAPA would merely gild the lily.
B. Immigration Officials Have Not Shown That Limited Resources
Require Resorting to DAPA
While the executive branch has argued that resource constraints
require implementation of DAPA,111 that assertion is also on shaky
ground. In its defense of DAPA, the Justice Department's Office of
Legal Counsel ("OLC") asserted that Congress had prioritized the
removal of noncitizens convicted of a crime, and that this priority
precluded removal of most other noncitizens who are unlawfully present
107. See Brian Bennett, High Deportation Figures Are Misleading, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2014,
http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-obama-deportations-20140402-story.html
[http://perma.cclVUJ9-AKV9] (reporting that interior removals dropped from 237,941 in 2009 to
133,551 in 2013); cf ICE Enforcement Report, supra note 107, at 7 (reporting that in 2014 ICE
removed 102,224 individuals from the U.S. interior). The drop from almost 238,000 interior removals
in 2009 to about 102,000 in 2014 amounts to a reduction of fifty-seven percent Cf David A. Martin,
Resolute Enforcement is Not Just for Restrictionists: Building a Stable and Efficient Inrmgration
Enforcement System, 30 J. L. & POL. 411, 425 (2015) (arguing that interior enforcement has received
short shrift in current and previous administrations and that "[s]uccessful immigration enforcement
necessarily rests on complementary action both at the border and in the interior").
108. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y of Homeland Sec., on Policies for the
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants at 3-4 (Nov. 20, 2014),
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14-1120-memo-prosecutorial-discretion.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VLV3-PVED].
109. ICE Enforcement Report, supra note 14, at 9.
110. Id. at 9-10; ci id. at 9 (reporting that over half of this group involved individuals who had
been convicted of an aggravated felony).
111. See OLC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
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in the United States. 112 However, OLC's math is an ipse divit, not a
reasoned conclusion from available evidence.
Congress has budgeted over $5.2 billion for immigration
enforcement.113 Immigration officials have claimed that this amount, in
conjunction with the prioritization of noncitizens who have committed
crimes, allows ICE to remove 400,000 noncitizens annually.114
However, immigration officials have cited no support for this
contention.1 15 Congress required federal officials to devote $1.6 billion
to the identification of noncitizens who had committed crimes.1 16 That
leaves $3.6 billion available for other immigration enforcement. To be
worthy of deference, a claim that $3.6 billion is insufficient should cite
some supporting evidence, since many agencies and individuals would
find this amount sufficient for their own needs. Immigration officials
have not deigned to furnish budgetary analyses or studies to support
their claim.
Of course, as OLC asserted, immigration officials lack the
resources to remove all undocumented individuals in the United
States." 7 However, that state of affairs is neither surprising nor unique
to immigration. Budgets constrain enforcement in virtually every area
of law.' 18 This requires governments to set priorities. However, it does
not require the establishment of an affirmative program that grants or
facilitates receipt of valuable benefits, such as work authorization or a
formal reprieve from removal, for a substantial proportion of
individuals or entities who have violated the law. Enforcement officials
faced with analogous resource constraints in other areas of law do not
provide such benefits. For example, even though the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission lacks the resources to pursue all securities law
violators, it has not invited violators to apply for a declination letter
disclaiming any intent to prosecute for a renewable period.1 9 Nothing
112. Id.
113. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, div. F, tit. II, 128 Stat. 5,
250 (containing the DHS Appropriations Act).
114. See Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Customs & Immigration Enforcement, on
Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, & Removal of Aliens, at
1, (Mar. 2, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf
[http://perma.cc/MXC2-U4U4].
115. Id. By "no support," I mean that neither the Morton Memo cited above, nor other ICE
documents made public, disclose budgetary analysis done by ICE to arrive at this figure.
116. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014,128 Stat. at 251.
117. See OLC Memorandum, supra note 11, at 10.
118. See, e.g., James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REv. 115, 127 (2012) (noting, in securities law context, that "public enforcers
may underenforce because they face resource limitations.").
119. Id. at 147-48 (describing consequences of delay in Securities and Exchange Commission
enforcement and listing consequences of that delay, which do not include issuance of declination
letters). When Congress has expressly authorized benefits to violators in contexts such as tax law, it
has typically required that violators accompany their request with payment of an amount
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in the INA requires a departure from this prudent practice.
C The Law in Action Establishes DAPA's Conflict with the INA
While inaccuracy undermines the pro-DAPA "law in action"
arguments regarding enforcement priorities and resources, several law
in action arguments actually highlight DAPA's clash with the INA.
Consider the argument made by immigration officials and scholars
favoring DAPA that these benefits are revocable at any time and
therefore do not intrude on Congress's prerogatives.1 2 0 Empirical
results from Professor Motomura's "law in action" demonstrates that
revocation rarely occurs, while renewal of deferred action is virtually
automatic.
Consider the government's track record under the Administration's
earlier Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program.
The government's responses to congressional queries indicate that
DACA grants have remained in effect in 99.98% of cases analyzed by
DHS. 121 Moreover, the government has readily renewed grants of
DACA benefits, including grants of an additional year, which the
government has since acknowledged were barred by the injunction in
the Texas v. United States122 case challenging DAPA. 123 DACA is a
useful template for analysis of DAPA because it is the only deferred
action program that is even remotely comparable to DAPA in size and
scope. If DACA's track record is indicative of how DAPA will be
implemented, DAPA renewals will be routine, while DAPA
terminations will occur far less often than a lunar eclipse. In other
words, DAPA will not provide a mere respite from removal, but the
functional equivalent of an indefinite stay.
The empirical slant of "law in action" also highlights the artificiality
of DAPA supporters' argument that DAPA grants deferred action, not
work authorization.1 24  On this view, deferred action is merely a
corresponding to a portion of their violation. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 7122(a) (2012) (authorizing
acceptance of offers of compromise by Secretary of the Treasury prior to referral of tax arrears cases
to Department of Justice); id. § 7122(c)(1) (requiring tender of partial payment of tax liability with
offer of compromise); cf Shu-Yi Oei, Getting More By Asking Less: Justifying and Reforming Tax
Law's Offer-in-Compromise Procedure, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1071, 1077 (2012) (discussing offers-in-
compromise procedure).
120. See DAPA Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2 (asserting that deferred action "may be
terminated at any time at the agency's discretion.").
121. See Record on Appeal, Texas v. United States, (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2015) (No. 15-40238), at
2225 (available on PACER and on file with the author). Out of 591,555 DACA grants, there have
been only 113subsequent DACA terminations-a rate of approximately in 5,000or just .02%. Id.
122. 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
123. See Texas v. United States, No. B-14-254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45482, at *20-23 (S.D.
Tex. Apr. 7,2015).
124. See DAPA Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3 (asserting that immigration officials grant
employment authorization under "separate [legal] authority").
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predicate for work authorization, which officials grant under a separate
section of the statute.125 However, this distinction between deferred
action and work authorization is strained. At best, it concerns the
timing of employment authorization, not whether DAPA's effects are
consistent with the INA's overall context. According to the most
diligent analyst of the government's statistics on grants of deferred
action, the overwhelming majority of work authorization applications
for deferred action recipients are approved.1 26
Indeed, the government's own descriptions of DAPA assume that
the vast majority of DAPA recipients will receive work authorization.
In his prosecutorial discretion memorandum, DHS Secretary Jeh
Johnson rightly described prospective DAPA recipients as "hard-
working people."1 27 Given that prospective DAPA recipients, like most
other individuals, presumably work in order to support themselves and
their families, it would be cruelly Kafkaesque to describe them in these
terms and then deny work authorization. Secretary Johnson's
prosecutorial discretion memorandum also expressed the hope that
grants of deferred action would "encourage" DAPA recipients to apply
for work authorization. 1 28  This encouragement would be futile if
officials denied most requests. Indeed, common sense demonstrates
that if prospective recipients learned through the "grapevine" that work
authorization was unlikely, they would not bother to apply, given
undocumented noncitizens' general wariness of contact with the
government. In this sense, Secretary Johnson's urging to undocumented
noncitizens to "come out of the shadows" 129 hinged on the sensible
expectation shared by government, immigration advocates, and
immigrants themselves that in the bulk of cases a DAPA grant would be
a prelude to employment authorization.
Moreover, the underlying standard that the government follows in
granting work authorization to deferred action recipients -whether such
individuals can demonstrate an "economic necessity" for
125. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(h)(3); 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014); cf Anil Kalhan, Deferred
Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion, and the Rule of Law Basis for Executive Action on
Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 58, 76 (2015) (arguing that DAPA does not itself confer
employment authorization, and that likelihood of work authorization for DAPA grantees is legally
irrelevant).
126. See Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Demystifyng Employment Authorization and Prosecutorial
Discretion in Immigration Cases, COLUM. J. RACE & L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 26-27)
(available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2630133 (click hyperlink "download
this paper")) [hereinafter Wadhia, Demystifying Employment Authorization] (noting that in 2012
and 2013, the government approved at least eighty-six percent of work authorization applications
from deferred action recipients).
127. See DAPA Memorandum, supra note 11, at 3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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employment1 3 0-is a straightforward standard that appropriately leads
to authorization in most cases.131 That is as it should be: once the
government has lawfully granted deferred action-immigration officials
should not unduly impede grantees' efforts to support themselves and
their dependents. However, grants of deferred action must be
consistent with the INA. Determining whether the blanket grants of
deferred action contemplated by DAPA meet that standard brings us
back to the inquiry into the INA's context and cornerstone principles.
That inquiry finds DAPA wanting.
The "law in action" regarding the low likelihood of removal for
deferred action recipients and the high likelihood of work authorization
also counters the claim that DAPA is consistent with the INA because it
provides no "legal status" to prospective recipients.13 2 As the House
Judiciary Report on IIRIRA explained almost twenty years ago, the
"driving force" behind unlawful immigration is not the hope of legal
status per se, but the rational expectation of a U.S. job. 133 Professor
Motomura readily acknowledges that millions of people from Mexico
have decided to enter the U.S. unlawfully because of the benefits that
this decision entails, even without the likelihood of legal status. 134
While lawyers know the difference between immigration benefits
and legal status, to the millions of prospective DAPA recipients the
distinction between status and benefits is of minimal relevance. In the
short to intermediate term, DAPA provides prospective recipients with
virtually all of the advantages that they would expect from permanent
legal residence. Undocumented immigrants, like most human beings,
make decisions based on the short term.135 By providing prospective
recipients with a renewable reprieve from removal and the strong
probability of work authorization, DAPA would offer the short- and
intermediate-term equivalent of legal status.136 That functional
130. 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (2014).
131. SeeWadhia, DemystifngEmploymentAutholization, supra note 126, at mss. 26-27; cf id.
at mss. 18-19 (noting that in a sample of 233,245 work authorization applications received , officials
approved eighty-seven percent of applications, while seven percent were still pending, and six percent
were denied).
132. See DAPA Memorandum, supra note 11, at 2; cf Kalhan, supra note 125, at 70-72
(developing this argument).
133. See 1996 House Judiciary Report, supra note 55, at 108.
134. See Motomura, supra note 8, at 19.
135. See George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, "We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard
Way" Negative Emotions, Self-regulation, and the Law, 73 U. CHi. L. REV. 183, 183 (2006)
(summarizing data indicating that, "humans are inherently myopic. . .").
136. A DAPA grant would give recipients many, although not all, of the advantages of legal
status. Admittedly, it would not give recipients the right to vote in U.S. elections or other rights
contingent on citizenship. Nor would it give recipients the right to sponsor their parents for
admission to the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (giving citizens over twenty-
one the right to sponsor parents and other immediate relatives for admission as lawful permanent
residents). The inability to sponsor parents is the only material short- or intermediate-term
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equivalence, not the technical difference between status and benefits,
provides the best yardstick for assessing DAPA's consistency with the
INA. If immigration officials cannot award legal status unilaterally to
noncitizens with no reasonable prospect of obtaining that status under
the INA, officials should similarly not be able to award a bundle of
immigration benefits that provides the functional equivalent of legal
status.
The conclusion that DAPA is functionally equivalent to legal status
in the short- and intermediate-term brings our inquiry back to where we
started: the art of legislative compromise. Professor Motomura rightly
argues that Mexican immigrants have from the start disregarded the
limits on per-country immigration that Congress imposed in the 1965
Immigration Act when it abolished national origin quotas. While "law
on the books" classifies this disregard as a violation of the INA, the law
in action has not effectively deterred such conduct.1 37 As Professor
Motomura contends, the gap between law on the books and law in
action requires action of its own. 138  However, for the sake of
consistency with both the INA and the separation of powers, that action
needs to come from Congress.
V. CONCLUSION
Professor Motomura's distinction between law on the books and
the law in action performs valuable work in the current immigration
debate. First, it highlights the importance of enactment of
comprehensive immigration reform by Congress, to close the gap
between the INA's provisions and facts on the ground. Second, it
illustrates the adverse effects that DAPA will have on the INA's
structure of deterrence. Read in context, as precedent requires, the
logic, structure, and purpose of the INA unambiguously preclude
DAPA's implementation. Failing to read the INA in context would
license through administrative law the kind of unilateral executive
action that the separation of powers prohibits. This emphasis on the
INA's context may not have been Professor Motomura's intent.
However, it calls us back to congressional intent, which should always
be the touchstone of statutory interpretation. Reconnected with that
foundation, we can continue the challenging work of immigration
reform in a mode that is faithful to the Framers' vision.
immigration difference between a DAPA grant and legal status. While a DAPA recipient would also
not have the right to sponsor a spouse or child for admission to the United States, for most DAPA
recipients, that will be a moot point: by definition, the recipient's children are already U.S. citizens
and the recipient's spouse, if he or she is also a parent of citizen children, will be DAPA-eligible.
137. See Motomura, supra note 8, at 19.
138. Id.
172 [ Vol. 55
